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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Joseph Butch challenges his conviction following a jury 
trial in the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey (the "District Court") on one count of violating 
21 U.S.C. S 846 by conspiring to distribute and to possess 
with intent to distribute oxycodone, a Schedule II narcotic 
controlled substance, contrary to 21 U.S.C.S 841(a)(1). He 
also challenges the sentence imposed by the District Court. 
Butch alleges that the District Court (1) impr operly 
admitted evidence of prior thefts of oxycodone at trial, (2) 
erred in determining the applicable sentencing range under 
the United States Sentencing Guidelines by attributing to 
him the entire weight of each pill rather than calculating 
the amount of the controlled substance per pill, and (3) 
erred by failing to submit the weight of the controlled 
substance to the jury for a factual determination beyond a 
reasonable doubt in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466 (2000). We have jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. For the r easons that follow, 
we will affirm the conviction and sentence. 
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I. 
 
At the time of this alleged criminal activity, Butch was 
employed as a scheduler and dispatcher for two r elated, 
Philadelphia-based commercial truck and driver leasing 
companies, Marano Truck Lease ("Marano") and American 
Helper ("AH"). Marano and AH leased trucks and drivers to 
the courier service Rapid Delivery Services ("RDS"). RDS in 
turn was employed by Amerisource, a wholesale distributor 
of pharmaceutical drugs and other medical pr oducts, to 
deliver those products from its war ehouse in Thorofare, 
New Jersey, to hospitals and pharmacies. 
 
From September, 1997 through January, 1998, Butch 
scheduled Robert Manning ("Manning"), a temporary driver 
for AH, to a delivery route for Amerisour ce. According to 
Manning's testimony, on January 7, 1998 Butch of fered 
Manning $5000 to help him steal a tote of Amerisour ce's 
pharmaceutical drugs from the back of the delivery truck 
that Manning would be driving the next day. Manning 
agreed. On January 8, 1998, Manning met Butch and 
another man at a Burger King restaurant on Front Street in 
Philadelphia. Butch retrieved a plastic tote containing the 
drugs from the back of the truck. After Manning had 
resumed his route, Butch discovered that he had stolen the 
wrong tote. Butch called Manning and arranged to have the 
third man meet Manning at a Dunkin' Donuts shop to pick 
up the correct tote, which he did. When Manning arrived 
later at the Veteran's Administration hospital in 
Philadelphia, he called the police and reported the theft as 
planned. Several days later, Butch gave Manning the 
agreed-upon $5000. 
 
In April and May of 1998, Butch twice solicited Manning 
to steal pharmaceutical drugs from Amerisource trucks 
that others were driving. Butch identified the trucks, the 
delivery routes and the drug totes, and gave Manning the 
key. Manning was to follow the trucks and steal the drugs 
when the drivers left the trucks unattended. Manning took 
the keys, but did not follow through with the theft of any 
drugs. 
 
On May 19, 1998, Butch offered $5000 to George Fronick 
("Fronick"), another AH driver who made deliveries for 
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Amerisource, to help him steal pharmaceutical drugs from 
the truck Fronick was driving. Fronick r eported the plan to 
his supervisor at RDS, and the FBI and DEA wer e notified. 
Investigators for the two agencies arranged for Fr onick to 
cooperate in apprehending Butch. 
 
After a failed attempt on May 20, 1998, Butch again 
solicited Fronick to assist him in his theft plans. Fronick 
reported the solicitation to his supervisor , and the 
investigators supplied Fronick with a concealed micro- 
cassette recorder and a video camera to place in the back 
of his truck. On June 4, 1998, Butch detailed the plan to 
have Fronick arrive at Mercy Hospital at 6:30 a.m., drive 
the front of the truck up to the loading dock, and unlock 
the back of the truck. A third man would unload the totes 
from the back of the truck. Fronick was then to get rid of 
the padlock, and report the theft to the police. This 
conversation was recorded on the micr o-cassette carried by 
Fronick. The third man was Manning, who testified that 
Butch instructed him to take the drugs from the back of 
the truck, deliver them to Butch at a Dunkin' Donuts shop 
near the Marano facility, and report to a job Butch had 
scheduled for him. 
 
Early the next morning, Fronick met Butch at a gas 
station and went over the plan. Butch gave Fr onick two 
plastic trash bags, told him to put the boxes of drugs into 
the bags, and to leave them at the back of the truck. 
Fronick picked up the delivery and drove his truck to Mercy 
Hospital according to Butch's instructions. When he 
reached the hospital parking lot, Fronick activated the 
hidden camera in the truck and proceeded with the plan. In 
addition to the hidden camera and the hospital's own 
surveillance camera, the investigators had the entir e scene 
under surveillance. They observed Butch and another man, 
Fred Moll ("Moll"), sitting inside Moll's car. They also 
observed Manning approach the truck, remove two plastic 
bags containing the boxes of pharmaceutical drugs, and 
place them into the trunk of his car. As Manning attempted 
to drive out of the hospital parking lot, the investigators 
stopped and arrested him, seizing the bags fr om the trunk. 
Other agents blocked Moll's car and arrested Moll and 
Butch. The bags contained 26,400 Endocet tablets, a 
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generic form of Percocet, each tablet containing 
approximately 4.4 milligrams of oxycodone and 325 
milligrams of acetaminophen. See Physicians' Desk 
Reference 1211 (55th ed. 2001). 
 
On June 18, 1998 a federal grand jury sitting in Newark, 
New Jersey returned a one count indictment, charging 
"[f]rom on or about May 19, 1998 to on or about June 5, 
1998, . . . Joseph Butch did knowingly and intentionally 
conspire and agree with others to distribute and to possess 
with intent to distribute oxycodone, a Schedule II narcotic 
drug controlled substance, contrary to T itle 21, United 
States Code, Section 841(a)(1), [i]n violation of Title 21 
United States Code, Section 846." The indictment did not 
specify the quantity of oxycodone attributable to Butch. 
 
On April 26, 1999, the Government filed a motion in 
limine seeking the admission of evidence of Butch's 
January and May, 1998 dealings with Manning as intrinsic 
to the conspiracy charged or, alter natively, as admissible 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). On May 3, 1999, 
the day that the jury trial began, the District Court issued 
a published opinion1 denying the Government's motion to 
admit the evidence as intrinsic to the conspiracy and as 
evidence of a common scheme and plan.2  However, the 
District Court admitted under Rule 404(b) the testimony of 
Manning for the limited purpose of establishing the 
background of the conspiracy as charged in the indictment. 
The District Court also recited the limiting instruction it 
intended to accompany the evidence. 
 
The Government introduced evidence of the January and 
May, 1998 events at trial. The limiting instruction was 
given. Butch testified in his own defense, denying any 
criminal intent and claiming that it was Manning who had 
solicited him to steal the drugs. Butch also testified that he 
pretended to participate in the scheme in or der to catch 
Manning in the act. The jury rejected Butch's defense and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See United States v. Butch, 48 F . Supp. 2d 453 (D.N.J. 1999). 
 
2. The indictment alleged a conspiracy fr om May 19 to June 5, 1998, 
which in the District Court's opinion render ed the events in January and 
early May, 1998 too remote to be inextricably intertwined with the 
conspiracy as charged, and not part of a single criminal episode. 
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on May 11, 1999, convicted him of the charge. The District 
Court sentenced Butch to 240 months (20 years) 
imprisonment, the statutory maximum for the crime of 
which he was convicted. 
 
II. 
 
Butch's initial challenge on appeal is that the District 
Court improperly permitted the Gover nment to introduce 
evidence of his January and May, 1998 dealings with 
Manning under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).3 The 
nature of his objection is twofold. First, Butch argues that 
the testimony of specific events admitted to establish the 
background of a conspiratorial relationship goes well 
beyond the limited, general questioning that this Court 
permits. See United States v. O'Leary, 739 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 
1984). Second, he argues that the probative value of the 
evidence is substantially outweighed by its pr ejudicial 
effect. We review the District Court's decision to admit 
evidence under Rule 404(b) for an abuse of discr etion, 
which "may be reversed only when `clearly contrary to 
reason and not justified by the evidence'." United States v. 
Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 436 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing United States 
v. Bethancourt, 65 F.3d 1074, 1079 (3d Cir. 1995)). We 
conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion 
in admitting Manning's testimony as background evidence 
of a conspiratorial relationship pursuant to Rule 404(b). 
 
The "threshold inquiry a court must make before 
admitting similar acts evidence under Rule 404(b) is 
whether that evidence is probative of a material issue other 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides: 
 
       (b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs, 
       or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in 
order 
       to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
       admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, 
       intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake 
       or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the 
       prosecution in a criminal case shall pr ovide reasonable notice in 
       advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial 
notice 
       on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it 
       intends to introduce at trial. 
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than character." Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 
686 (1988). This Court recently set out a four -factor 
standard governing the admissibility of evidence pursuant 
to Rule 404(b), which requires: (1) a pr oper evidentiary 
purpose; (2) relevance under Rule 402; (3) a weighing of the 
probative value of the evidence against its pr ejudicial effect 
under Rule 403; and (4) a limiting instruction concerning 
the purpose for which the evidence may be used. United 
States v. Mastrangelo, 172 F.3d 288, 294 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
The District Court found that the Government met its 
burden of articulating the requisite "chain of logical 
inferences" in support of a proper evidentiary purpose, 
satisfying the first prong. Butch, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 459 
(citing Mastrangelo, 172 F.3d at 294). Because Manning's 
testimony was "logically relevant to explain his role in the 
criminal enterprise" and because it "would give the jury a 
complete story of the crime by explaining the cir cumstances 
of the alleged relationship between the alleged 
conspirators," the District Court found the testimony 
relevant under the second prong. Id. at 460. Under the Rule 
403 balancing test, the District Court concluded that the 
probative value of Manning's testimony outweighed any 
prejudicial effect. "As an alleged participant in the charged 
conspiracy, Manning's testimony is significantly probative 
of the formation of his criminal relationship with Butch in 
January, 1998, as well as[ ] the further development of that 
relationship during the events of early May, 1998." Id. 
Moreover, the evidence of the prior criminal activity detailed 
a similar crime against the same victim, without the use of 
violence or threats, and thus the testimony to this effect 
was not overly prejudicial. Thus, the District Court 
concluded that the evidence "does not rise to the level of 
the distracting, confusing, or emotionally char ged evidence 
from which Rule 403 protects a criminal defendant." Id. at 
461. Finally, the District Court gave the requisite limiting 
instruction to satisfy the fourth prong and eliminate an 
"undue tendency . . . suggest[ing] a decision on an 
improper basis . . . ." See Fed. R. Evid. 403, Advisory 
Committee's Note.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Deciding on the Government's motion in limine, the District Court 
stated: 
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In light of the District Court's thorough analysis in its 
published opinion of Manning's testimony under the 
Mastrangelo factors, Butch cannot demonstrate an abuse of 
discretion. This Court has held that "testimony of . . . a co- 
conspirator . . . could be considered r elevant to provide 
necessary background information, to show an ongoing 
relationship between [the defendant and a co-conspirator], 
and to help the jury understand the co-conspirator's role in 
the scheme." United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d 1042, 
1050 (3d Cir. 1982). This was precisely the purpose for 
which the Government sought to introduce Manning's 
testimony. Moreover, in its discussion of O'Leary, the 
District Court noted: 
 
       The Government's evidentiary purposes in O'Leary and 
       the Government's evidentiary purposes in this case are 
       identical, namely, to show background of the charges, 
       the witness' and the defendant's relationship, and their 
       concerted action. In light of Simmons, Harris, Moore, 
       and Pipola, Butch's attempt to limit O'Leary to its 
       specific facts, though spirited, is without merit. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       Prior to the Government's inquiry into the events of January and 
       early May, 1998, at the conclusion of Manning's testimony, and 
       again when I charge the jury, I will instruct the jury as follows: 
 
       Evidence that Mr. Butch was involved in a criminal enterprise 
       with Mr. Manning in January, 1998, and with Mr. Manning and 
       Mr. Frederick Moll in early May, 1998, has been admitted into 
       evidence, but you may consider that evidence only as background 
       to the offense charged in the Indictment, as evidence of Mr. 
       Manning's and Mr. Butch's relationship prior to May 19, 1998, 
       and as evidence of their concerted efforts prior to May 19, 1998. 
       You may not, however, consider this evidence of Mr. Butch's prior 
       involvement in a criminal enterprise in deciding whether or not 
       the Government has proven Mr. Butch's guilt beyond a reasonable 
       doubt for the offense charged in the Indictment. For the limited 
       purpose for which this evidence has been received, you may give 
       it such weight as you feel it deserves. You may not, however, 
       consider this evidence for any other purpose. See 1 Devitt, et al., 
       Federal Jury Practice and Instructions S 11.09 (4th ed). 
 
Butch, 48 F. Supp.2d at 461. The limiting instruction actually given by 
the District Court mirrors this instruction. 
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       Accordingly, I find that the Government has sufficiently 
       proffered a proper evidentiary purpose for introducing 
       into evidence the January and early May, 1998, events. 
 
Butch, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 460 (citations omitted). We agree 
with the District Court's reading of O'Leary, and can find 
no abuse of the Court's discretion.5  As a result, we will 
affirm Butch's conviction. 
 
III. 
 
Butch also challenges his sentence on the gr ound that 
the District Court erred when it attributed to him the gross 
weight of the Endocet pills rather than the net weight of the 
controlled substance oxycodone in the pills. This error, he 
contends, resulted in an incorrect range under the 
Sentencing Guidelines. Our review of the District Court's 
interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines 
is plenary, whereas we review its findings of fact for clear 
error. United States v. Yeaman, 194 F.3d 442, 456 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
 
The District Court sentenced Butch to 240 months 
imprisonment, determined as follows. Accor ding to the 
DEA's laboratory report, the accuracy of which Butch did 
not contest, the 26,400 Endocet pills had a combined 
weight of 14.49 kilograms. See Presentence Report ("PSR") 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We also agree with the Gover nment's contention that it also could 
have introduced the evidence under Rule 404(b) to rebut Butch's 
testimony that he acted without criminal intent. Such evidence is 
permissible to show criminal intent and the absence of innocent 
association. See United States v. Zackson, 12 F.3d 1178, 1182-83 (2d 
Cir. 1993) (ruling evidence of appellant's prior involvement with the co- 
defendant in a marijuana trafficking and conspiracy properly admitted 
under Rule 404(b) as relevant to intent and to rebut defense of innocent 
association); see also United States v. Howell , 231 F.3d 615, 628-29 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (admitting evidence of appellant's previous drug-trafficking 
convictions under Rule 404(b) to rebut claimed innocent motive for being 
present where drugs were found); United States v. Williams, 31 F.3d 522, 
527 (7th Cir. 1994) (ruling evidence r egarding appellant's prior drug 
smuggling was properly admitted in a drug-trafficking conspiracy 
prosecution to rebut defense that he was merely an innocent Spanish 
interpreter for a co-conspirator). 
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at P18. Because oxycodone, the controlled substance in 
Endocet, is not one for which the Sentencing Guidelines' 
Drug Quantity Table provides a base of fense level by unit 
of weight, the Probation Office looked to the Drug 
Equivalency Tables found in Application Note 10 of S 2D1.1. 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, S 2D1.1(c) (1998);6 PSR 
P17. According to those tables, one gram of oxycodone is 
equivalent to 500 grams of marijuana, resulting in this case 
to an equivalency of 7,245 kilograms of marijuana. PSR 
P18. The base offense level for this quantity is 34. See U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual, S 2D1.1(c)(3). The District 
Court overruled Butch's objection to the PSR's calculation 
of drug quantity attributable to him "because the PSR 
accurately reflects the appropriate drug equivalency 
calculation under the United States Sentencing Guideline 
Section 2D1.1." The District Court imposed a two-level 
enhancement to this base level for Butch's r ole as a 
manager or supervisor of the offense pursuant to S 3B1.1(c) 
of the Sentencing Guidelines. The District Court then found 
Butch's criminal history category to be IV. See PSR PP 56-83.7 
The effective Sentencing Guideline range was 262 to 327 
months. However, given the statutory maximum penalty of 
240 months, the District Court sentenced Butch to the 
statutory maximum pursuant to S 5G1.1 of the Sentencing 
Guidelines, which provides that "wher e the statutorily 
authorized maximum sentence is less than the minimum of 
the applicable guideline range, the statutorily authorized 
maximum sentence shall be the guideline sentence." 
 
In support of his argument, Butch cites to Amendment 
517 to the Sentencing Guidelines,8 applicable to Schedule I 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The 1998 edition of the Sentencing Guidelines is applicable in this 
case. 
 
7. Butch does not challenge either of these deter minations on appeal. 
 
8. Amendment 517 
 
       modifies S 2D1.1 . . . with respect to the determination of the 
offense 
       levels for Schedule I and II Depressants . . . by applying the Drug 
       Quantity Table according to the number of pills, capsules or 
tablets 
       rather than by the gross weight of the pills, capsules or tablets. 
       . . . The current guidelines use the total weight of the pill, 
capsule, 
       or tablet containing the controlled substance. This method leads to 
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or II Depressants, which equates one unit or one pill to one 
gram of marijuana (as opposed to the 500 grams of 
marijuana figure used by the District Court). He argues 
that because, under the language of 28 C.F.R.S 1308.12(e), 
oxycodone acts like a depressant and is not specifically 
excepted or listed in another schedule, oxycodone qualifies 
as a Schedule II Depressant. If this pr ovision of the Drug 
Equivalency Table were followed as Butch suggests, the 
drug equivalency would equal 26.4 kilograms of marijuana, 
not 7,245 kilograms. The resultant base of fense level would 
then be 18. Alternatively, using the net weight of the 
oxycodone would result in an equivalency of 59 kilograms 
of marijuana and a base offense level of 20. Butch invokes 
the rule of lenity9 to resolve the alleged ambiguity in the 
Sentencing Guidelines with respect to the calculation of the 
drug equivalency of oxycodone after Amendment 517. 
 
Butch's argument fails for two reasons. His assertion that 
the net controlled substance should be used in determining 
the base offense level is directly contrary to Application 
Note A to the Drug Quantity Table, which pr ovides that 
"[u]nless otherwise specified, the weight of a controlled 
substance set forth in the table refers to the entire weight 
of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount 
of the controlled substance." See U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual, S 2D1.1(c), cmt. n.A. Mor eover, this 
argument was expressly rejected by this Court in United 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       anomalies because the weight of most pills is deter mined primarily 
       by the filler rather than the controlled substance. Thus, heavy 
pills 
       lead to higher offense levels even though ther e is little or no 
       relationship between gross weight and the potency of the pill. 
       Applying the Drug Quantity Table accor ding to the number of pills 
       will both simplify guideline application and mor e fairly assess 
the 
       scale and seriousness of the offense. 
 
Appendix C to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, November 1, 
1997, p. 341 ("Appendix C"). 
 
9. The rule of lenity provides that "when ambiguity in a criminal statute 
cannot be clarified by either its legislative history or inferences drawn 
from the overall statutory scheme, the ambiguity is resolved in favor of 
the defendant." United States v. Pollen, 978 F.2d 78, 85 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(citing Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)). 
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States v. Gurgiolo, 894 F.2d 56 (3d Cir. 1990), wherein we 
reversed the District Court's calculation of the applicable 
drug quantity based on the net weight of the oxycodone in 
Percocet pills. 
 
       Indeed, Congress requires the whole drug to be 
       weighed when the drug consists at least in part of a 
       detectable amount of Schedule I substances, such as 
       LSD and heroin, which are the most danger ous 
       substances available. . . . In short, where Congress 
       provides for full-weight conversion of Schedule I, III 
       and IV substances, there is no self-evident r eason to 
       conclude that it meant to treat Schedule II drugs 
       differently. 
 
Id. at 61.10 
 
Second, oxycodone is not a Schedule II Depressant. It is 
a Schedule II Opiate, a classification distinguishable from 
Schedule II Depressants. See 21 U.S.C.S 812; 21 C.F.R. 
S 1308.12(b)(1); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, 
S 2D1.1(c). Consequently, Amendment 517 does not operate 
to require that oxycodone be converted into a drug 
equivalency based on the number of pills as opposed to its 
weight. Although Butch is correct that the Amendment 
replaced the marijuana drug equivalencies for Schedule I 
and II Depressants with a provision that one unit (pill, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The other Circuit Courts of Appeals to consider this issue are in 
agreement. See United States v. Limber opoulos, 26 F.3d 245, 252-53 (1st 
Cir. 1994) (concluding Application Note A applies to Percodan, Percocet 
and Valium); United States v. Meitinger , 901 F.2d 27, 29 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(ruling the same with respect to Dilaudid, containing the active 
ingredient hydromorphone, a Schedule II Opiate), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 
531 (1990); United States v. Blythe, 944 F .2d 356, 362 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(same); United States v. Young, 992 F .2d 207 (8th Cir.1993) (holding that 
the weight of the entire tablet and not just the amount of the illegal 
hydromorphine contained therein should be used to compute the 
defendant's sentence); United States v. Cr owell, 9 F.3d 1452, 1454-55 
(9th Cir. 1993) (same); United States v. Lazarchik, 924 F.2d 211, 214 
(11th Cir. 1991) (concluding the same with r espect to hydrocodone 
(Tussionex) and diazepam (Valium)), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 827 (1991); 
United States v. Shabazz, 933 F.2d 1029, 1032-33 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 
(ruling that Application Note A applies to Dilaudid), cert. denied, 502 
U.S. 964 (1991). 
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capsule or tablet) equals one gram of marijuana, the 
Amendment by its own terms does not extend to Schedule 
II Opiates. Appendix C at 340. The Congressional intent 
behind Amendment 517 is clear. Congress specifically 
excepted Schedule I and II Depressants, not Schedule I and 
II Opiates. Had Congress intended to modify the Guidelines 
with respect to the latter, it would have done so. Those 
Circuit Courts of Appeals to consider the issue, albeit in 
unpublished form, have come to the same conclusion. See 
United States v. Carruthers, 215 F.3d 1328, 2000 WL 
712382, *2 (6th Cir. 2000) (unpublished opinion); United 
States v. Flores, 112 F.3d 506, 1996 WL 599798, *2 (2d Cir. 
1996) (unpublished opinion). As the Sixth Cir cuit 
explained: 
 
       Congress only intended to make an exception for 
       Schedule I or II Depressants[,] not Schedule I or II 
       Opiates-the category to which hydromorphones belong. 
       Had it intended to make an exception for Opiates to be 
       measured by their active ingredients as opposed to the 
       gross weight of the drug, Congress pr esumably would 
       have done so. . . . . Amendment 517 was enacted to 
       clarify the law with respect to Schedule I and II 
       Depressants and Schedule III, IV and V contr olled 
       substances. Nothing more can be gleaned fr om the 
       Amendment. Therefore, Defendant's contention that 
       the legislative intent is inconsistent with the statute 
       must fall. 
 
Carruthers, 215 F.3d 1328, 2000 WL 712382 at *2. 
 
Moreover, no ambiguity exists in the operation of the 
Sentencing Guidelines with respect to oxycodone. The Drug 
Equivalency Tables provide that one gram of oxycodone is 
equivalent to 500 grams of marijuana. See U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual, S 2D1.1(c) (1998). Ther efore, Butch's 
reliance on the rule of lenity is misguided. United States v. 
Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000) ("Absent ambiguity, the 
rule of lenity is not applicable to guide statutory 
interpretation."); Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 
138-39 (1998) ("The rule of lenity applies only if, after 
seizing everything from which aid can be derived . . . we 
can make no more than a guess as to what Congr ess 
intended. . . . To invoke the rule, we must conclude that 
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there is a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the 
statute."). 
 
In summary, we can find no error in the District Court's 
determination of the quantity of oxycodone attributable to 
Butch, nor in the application of the Sentencing Guidelines 
to this determination. 
 
IV. 
 
Butch's final argument on appeal is that the District 
Court erred by failing to submit the weight of the controlled 
substance to the jury for a factual determination beyond a 
reasonable doubt in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466 (2000). The preliminary issue is whether Apprendi 
even applies to cases in which judicial factfinding at 
sentencing increases the Sentencing Guideline range, and 
thus the potential sentence, above the statutory maximum, 
but the actual sentence imposed is equal to the statutory 
maximum. Because Butch did not raise this claim in the 
District Court at sentencing, we review his challenge for 
plain error. United States v. Mack , 229 F.3d 226, 234-35 & 
n.12 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
Our recent decision in United States v. W illiams, 235 
F.3d 858 (3d Cir. 2000) controls this case. In Williams, the 
appellant argued that Apprendi was implicated because the 
trial court's finding of drug quantity incr eased the 
prescribed range of penalties and the maximum penalty to 
which he was exposed, even though his actual penalty did 
not exceed 20 years. Id. at 863. We ruled that "Apprendi is 
not applicable to [Appellant's] sentence, because the 
sentence actually imposed . . . was well under the original 
statutory maximum of 20 years." Id. at 863 (relying on 
Mack, 229 F.3d 226). 
 
In Mack, Chief Judge Becker prescribed a two-step 
"Apprendi inquiry" under which 
 
       [a] court must first determine the"prescribed statutory 
       maximum" sentence for the crime of which the 
       defendant was convicted and assess whether the 
       defendant's ultimate sentence exceeded it. If it did, the 
       court must consider . . . whether the enhanced 
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       sentence was based on "the fact of a prior conviction." 
       If it was, then the sentence is constitutional. If it was 
       not, then the sentence is unconstitutional. 
 
Id. at 237. Just as in Williams, Butch's claim fails to get 
past step one because the ultimate sentence imposed by 
the District Court did not exceed the "pr escribed statutory 
maximum" of 20 years. Apprendi is therefore not 
implicated. 
 
V. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affir m Mr. Butch's 
conviction and sentence. 
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